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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the effect of smoking bans in public places on the exposure to tobacco 
smoke of non-smokers and contrasts it with the effect of excise taxes. Exploiting data on 
cotinine - a metabolite of nicotine - as well as state and time variation in anti-smoking 
policies across US states, we show that smoking bans in public places can perversely increase 
the exposure of non-smokers to tobacco smoke by displacing smokers to private places where 
they contaminate non-smokers, and in particular young children. In contrast, we find that 
higher taxes are an efficient way to decrease exposure to tobacco smoke, especially for those 
most exposed. We supplement this analysis by showing that bans have little effect on 
smoking cessation, and present evidence of displacement from public places using data on 
time use. 
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Introduction 
 
In the US, about 15 percent of the whole population smokes regularly. Yet, detectable levels 
of tobacco related chemicals can be found in body fluids in 70 percent of non-smokers of all 
ages.1 A large medical and epidemiological literature has stressed the dangers of exposure to 
environmental tobacco smoke.2 Passive smoking has been linked to a number of serious 
illnesses such as lung cancer or heart disease in the adult population. Passive smoking 
particularly affects the health of young children and babies, causing asthma, bronchitis and 
sudden infant death syndrome. The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that exposure 
to smoke causes about 200,000 lower respiratory tract infections in young children each year, 
resulting in 10,000 hospitalizations (Environmental Protection Agency, 1992).  Medical 
studies consistently find that smokers impose a negative externality on non-smokers. As a 
result, local authorities and governments have come under pressure by the general public and 
by anti-tobacco groups to limit the exposure of non-smokers and generally to discourage 
smoking. Since the mid 1980s, support for smoking bans in public places has steadily risen. 
The proportion of individuals supporting a total ban in restaurants has increased from 20 
percent in 1985 to 54 percent in 2005. 3  Public intervention uses two instruments to 
discourage smoking: directly, by limiting or banning smoking in public places, and indirectly, 
by raising taxes on cigarettes. 
In this paper, we evaluate the effect of these policies on smokers and non-smokers 
and we document in particular their unintended consequences on children. We develop a 
model of the effect of smoking regulation on smoking, time use and passive smoking and 
show that smoking bans can have two distinct effects on non-smokers’ exposure to tobacco 
smoke: they decrease exposure in public places but can lead to a perverse increase in 
exposure by displacing smoking towards private areas.  
To test this model, we use several sources of data describing smoking prevalence, 
smoking cessation, time use, and in particular, cotinine levels (a metabolite of nicotine) in 
body fluids. We identify the effect of anti-smoking policies with difference –in-difference 
and triple difference estimators using the date of implementation of these policies, spatial 
variation and by contrasting their effect between week-days and week-ends. These 
econometric techniques allow us to relax the assumption of the exogeneity of smoking bans 
or excise taxes. 
We show that during the last two decades, bans in workplaces, bars and restaurants 
have led to a relative increase in the exposure of non-smokers, and in particular those who 
share a household with smokers. We hypothesise that such bans displace smoking to places 
where non-smokers are more exposed. To support these findings, we provide evidence of the 
effect of bans on smoking behavior and how individuals spend their time in various locations. 
We show that there is no clear evidence that smoking bans have a causal effect either on the 
prevalence of smoking or on smoking cessation and attempted quits. Using time use data, we 
show evidence of a displacement of smokers away from bars and restaurants when smoke 
free laws are passed. The evidence therefore supports the hypothesis of a displacement of 
smokers to places shared with non-smokers who then get more exposure to tobacco smoke. 
In contrast, we find that changes in tobacco taxes have a significant effect on the 
exposure to environmental smoke. We find a tax-elasticity of passive smoking of about -0.2, 
                                                   
1 See descriptive evidence in Appendix A. 
2 See for instance Law et al (1997), Hackshaw et al (1997), He et al (1999), Otsuka (2001), Whincup et al 
(2004), for adults and Strachan and Cook  (1997), Gergen et al (1998), Kriz et al (2000), Lam et al (2001), 
Mannino et al (2001)  for children who all find that exposure to passive smoke is harmful for non-smokers 
health. 
3 Source: Gallup poll (http://poll.gallup.com/). 
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which is higher than the tax-elasticity of cigarette consumption. The effect is particularly 
sizable for children who are exposed to their parents’ smoke. This suggests that excise taxes 
are an efficient tool to curb passive smoking as smokers cut down on cigarettes smoked in the 
company of non-smokers, especially children. 
The economic literature has focused on the effect of prices or taxes on smokers. 
Following the work of Becker and Murphy (1988), most papers estimate price elasticities 
both in the short and in the long run.4 The evidence in these papers suggests that prices have 
an effect on cigarette consumption. However, some recent papers dispute the effect of prices. 
DeCicca et al (2002) show that cigarette prices do not affect initiation at young ages. Adda 
and Cornaglia (2006) show that although taxes affect the number of cigarette smoked, 
smokers compensate by smoking each cigarette more intensively. Few papers analyze the 
effect of bans on smoking. Among these, Evans et al. (1999) show that workplace bans 
decrease the prevalence of smoking for those who work.  
While the literature on the effect of taxes or prices on smokers is quite large, there is 
hardly any evidence either on the effectiveness of these measures or on the effectiveness of 
restricting smoking for reducing smoking exposure among non-smokers.5 6 Yet, the debate in 
public circles and in the media on the effectiveness of different measures has recently 
intensified, and policies to ban smoking are often justified by the protection of non-smokers 
rather than smokers7. There is to our knowledge no study evaluating the response of passive 
smoking to the growing set of regulations and clean air Acts passed in the last decade or to 
changes in excise taxes8. One of the main reasons why there is hardly any work in the 
economic literature on the exposure of non-smokers to environmental smoke is the apparent 
difficulty of measuring passive smoking directly.  By using data from bio-samples, this paper 
fills the gap. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section I presents the theoretical 
framework used for analyzing the effect of passive smoke exposure, and outlines the 
estimation strategy. Section II evaluates the effect of anti-smoking policies on smokers and 
smoking cessation. Section III shows the effect of smoking bans on how smokers and non-
smokers spend their time. In Section IV, we investigate the effect of different state 
interventions on passive smoking, measured by the cotinine concentration present in non-
smokers. Finally, Section V concludes and discusses the implications of our results. 
 
 
I. Methodology  
 
This section discusses our framework for analyzing the effect of changes in smoking bans 
and in tax on passive smoking. In particular, we define our measure of passive smoking and 
describe our identification strategy. 
                                                   
4 See for instance the paper by Becker et al (1994), Chaloupka (1991), and references in Chaloupka and Warner 
(2000). 
5 One exception is the effect of maternal smoking on birth weight, see for instance Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) 
and Evans and Ringel (1999).  
6 The epidemiological literature has examined the issue of passive smoking, mostly from its health consequences. This 
literature has produced a measure of passive smoking by analyzing the concentration of cotinine, a metabolite of 
nicotine, in blood, saliva or urine samples. The amount of cotinine is a good marker of the exposure to environmental 
smoke (Jarvis et al 1984). The epidemiological literature has also tried to characterize the socio-economic groups that 
are more prone to exposure to environmental smoke (Pirkle et al, 1996; Howard et al, 1998; Siegel, 1993; Jarvis et al, 
2001; Whitlock et al, 1998; Jarvis et al, 2000; Strachan and Cook, 1997).  
7 See for instance ASH (2005) for a summary of the case for smoke free public places. 
8 A search in EconLit for the key words “passive smoking” generates only 4 hits that are unrelated to the issue 
discussed here. 
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A. A model of passive smoking 
 
To fix ideas, we present a simple model of the effect of smoking regulation on smoking and 
passive smoking. Suppose that a smoker derives utility from the number of cigarettes 
consumed, c , from another consumption good, q , from leisure either at home ( HT ) or in 
bars ( BT ), and from total smoking time ( ST ). This last argument of the utility function is due 
to a desire to smooth cigarette consumption. Consumers derive disutility during periods of 
craving, when nicotine levels fall. As the time when smoking is permitted decreases, smokers 
are less able to smooth consumption over time, which leads to longer periods of craving. The 
individual’s objective is to optimally choose consumption and time allocation such as: 
 
(1)   SBHQc
BH
SBHTTqc
TTTqc ααααα
,,,
max  
 
The utility function is increasing in all its arguments ( SBHQcii ,,,,,0 =≥α ). Total time 
during the day is the sum of time spent at home, in bars and at work: WBH TTTT ++=~ . We 
assume that labor supply is fixed in the short run and does not change as a function of 
smoking bans. We denote by BHW TTTTT +=−= ~  the period available for leisure. 
Smoking time is defined as WWBBHS TTTT ρρ ++= , where WBii ,},1,0{ =∈ρ  are 
indicators of the absence of a ban. When a ban is introduced, either at work or in bars, 
smoking time in that location is reduced to zero.  
The agent maximizes the utility function subject to a budget constraint: pcqy += , 
where y is income and p is the relative price of cigarettes. Optimization of this program leads 
to the optimal cigarette consumption and time allocation. 
When no ban is in place, the optimal time spent at home is: 
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When smokers cannot smoke in bars, the optimal time spent at home is: 
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Moreover, if 0>SBαα , which is true given the assumption of the utility function, then 
)0()1( ** HH TT < . Faced with a smoking ban in bars, a smoker would optimally spend more 
time at home.9  The optimal number of cigarettes smoked is: 
 
(4)     
p
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9 Adda et al (2006) provides evidence that a smoking ban introduced in Scotland decreased the number of 
customers. Adams and Cotti (2007) show the negative effect of smoking bans on the hospitality industry in the 
US following smoking bans. 
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The total consumption of cigarettes during the whole day depends only on prices and income, 
but not on smoking bans. Later in this section we discuss extensions of this model where bans 
could have an effect on overall consumption.  
If smokers have a desire to smooth consumption over time, the number of cigarettes 
smoked at home and in bars is: 
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The model implies that the number of cigarettes smoked at home increases when bans are in 
place, either in bars or at work. Note that TW is not indexed by the existence of bans as we 
assume time at work as fixed. 
We pointed out earlier that according to this model total consumption does not vary 
with bans. We can think of two extensions to this model with opposite implications. First, 
smokers derive utility from nicotine and not necessarily from cigarettes alone. To guard 
against low levels of nicotine during periods of forced abstinence due to bans, smokers may 
be tempted to smoke before the start of such a period. As the human body is inefficient in 
storing nicotine, which is constantly metabolized, smokers may have to increase consumption 
to compensate. This would lead to an increase in cigarette consumption following a ban. A 
second factor would have the opposite implication, and relies on non-separable utility over 
time as in Becker and Murphy (1988). Due to adjacent complementarity, a smoker would 
tend to decrease current consumption if future consumption is expected to be low. Hence, 
theory is ambiguous when predicting the effect of bans on total cigarette consumption.  
Up to now we have looked at smokers’ behavior. Let us now turn to non-smokers, and 
how their exposure to second hand smoke is affected by changes in smoking regulations.  
First, consider a non-smoker who does not live with smokers. Exposure to passive 
smoke in this case comes solely from outside home. A ban on smoking in public places will 
therefore unambiguously benefit that individual. The magnitude of this effect however 
depends on the amount of time that non-smokers spend in workplaces and in bars.   
Second, consider a non-smoker living with smokers who spends a fraction 
WBHii ,,, =λ  of his time at home, bars and at work respectively. In each of these places, he 
is exposed to a fraction δ of each cigarette smoked by the smoker. Hence, exposure is equal 
to: 
 
( )H H B B W WExpo c c cδ λ λ λ= + +  
 
After some simple algebra, the change in exposure resulting from a ban in bars can be 
expressed as: 
 
(6)  [ ])()(~* WBBWHHW
BH
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T
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δ −+−+=Δ  
 
The effect of the ban on non-smokers is ambiguous and depends on the time spent at home, 
bars and work. Non-smokers who do not spend time at work (e.g. children) see an increase in 
exposure. For individuals who work, the effect is ambiguous and depends on the relative time 
spent at different locations. 
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The effect of smoking bans in bars is more complicated as smokers also adjust their 
time use. The change in exposure can be written as: 
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]WBHBSBHHSW
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where A is a positive coefficient. For individuals who do not spend any time in bars, the ban 
results in an increase in exposure. For all others, the effect is ambiguous and depends on the 
relative amount of time spent in bars, as bans reduce the direct exposure to tobacco smoke in 
this location. 
Smoking can also be regulated through higher cigarette prices. If prices are increased by a 
factor γ >1, the change in exposure for non smokers (living with a smoker) can be written as:  
 
(8)   ( )WWBBHH
QC
C
S
TTT
p
y
T
Expo λλλγ
γ
αα
αδ
++
−
+−=Δ
1  
 
Changes in excise taxes have an unambiguous effect on exposure. It is also straightforward to 
show that the effect of taxes is larger for non-smokers living with smokers than for those who 
do not. 
The model shows that it is not straightforward to infer the effect of government 
interventions on non-smokers by looking at the effect of these interventions on smokers (i.e. 
measuring the change in prevalence, or the change in the number of cigarettes smoked). 
Therefore, an empirical analysis should measure passive smoking directly in non-smokers. 
In summary, the model has four implications, which we test using a variety of data on 
smoking behavior, time use and data on exposure to tobacco smoke. First, the model 
indicates that cigarette consumption should not be affected by the introduction of anti-
smoking policies. Second, smoking bans in bars and restaurants should lead to a displacement 
of smoking and smokers towards home. Third, workplace bans are likely to lead to an 
increase exposure to tobacco smoke for children. This is also the case for bans in bars and 
restaurants provided that children do not spend much time in such locations. Finally, excise 
taxes should decrease exposure. 
 
B. Econometric specification 
 
In the empirical part of the paper, we test several predictions of our model. We investigate the 
effect of anti-smoking policies along three dimensions. First, we analyze the direct effect on 
smokers to test whether these policies lead to smoking cessation or reduced consumption. Second, 
we investigate the effect of smoking bans on time use and time spent with children. Finally, using 
data on cotinine in biological samples, we look for an effect of anti-smoking policies on non-
smokers. 
We regress these outcome variables on anti-smoking policies, using the following 
model: 
 
(9)  Sist = βwBstw + βgoBstgo + βT logTaxst + Xiγ + λ(s, t) + εist  
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where Sist  is a measure of smoking for individual i in state s and in period t, and Bst
w , Bst
go  are 
the percentages of individuals in a given state and year that are subject to a full ban at work 
and in bars and restaurants (“Going Out”). We also relate smoking to (log) excise taxes, Taxst, 
to individual characteristics, Xi, as well as to state specific characteristics denoted byλ(s,t). 
These include a state indicator, lagged state log GDP, and trends. Depending on the time 
length and the structure of the data set, we include either a set of aggregate time dummies, or 
region or state specific trends.10 
The identification of the effect of regulation and taxes comes from variation across states 
and time, and not from cross-sectional differences in the level of state regulations or taxes, which 
are taken into account by state dummies. Our identification relies on the exogeneity of changes in 
taxes and regulation within states, net of time trends, but not on the heterogeneity in levels of 
regulations and exposure to passive smoking.  
When we use cotinine data as a dependent variable the data set is shorter than the data on 
smoking behavior and does not support state trends. In an attempt to rectify this, as detailed 
below in Section IV, we include an aggregate time indicator as well as regional time trends. 
There may be some concerns that regional time trends do not fully capture variables that could be 
correlated both with passive exposure and the introduction of anti-smoking policies at state level. 
The way we address this concern is by enriching the model with time varying state characteristics. 
We use lagged smoking prevalence rate and cessation rate at state level. Tougher smoking 
regulations may be introduced in states where the prevalence of smoking is decreasing as they 
would be politically easier to implement if the median voter shifted towards a non-smoker. 
Another possibility is that tougher regulations are more likely to be enforced on health grounds in 
states where smoking is on the increase, or increasing relative to the rest of the country. 
Prevalence and cessation rates are key variables used to monitor smoking trends in relation to 
health issues and are easily observable by policy regulators.  
In addition, in Section IV.E, we relax the assumption of the exogeneity of taxes and 
smoking bans and show that we can consistently identify a subset of the parameters of interest 
which characterize displacement effects. 
The model is estimated by OLS, and standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at state level. This correction accounts for the presence of a common random effect 
at the state level. We therefore allow for serial correlation in the error term following Bertrand et 
al (2004) who show that difference-in-difference estimations can be seriously biased in the 
presence of autocorrelation. All regressions are weighted using the weights provided in the 
particular surveys to make the samples representative of the US population. This is important to 
make results comparable across different sections of the paper, as some surveys over-sample 
specific groups of the population. 
 
C. History of smoking bans and data  
 
Widespread smoking bans and smoking restrictions are a relatively novel phenomenon in the 
United States. Some attempts to ban smoking and the sales of cigarettes, on the grounds of 
moral concern, were made during the prohibition in the 1920s where 15 states banned 
cigarette sales. However, these laws were repealed by the end of that decade.  Half a century 
later, as research progressively made clear the effect of tobacco smoke, new efforts to ban 
smoking emerged. The first smoking bans to be introduced in the United States were in place 
in Minnesota in the mid-1970s. They required restaurants to have a non smoking section, 
while exempting bars. During the 1970s and the 1980s, smoking bans were progressively 
                                                   
10 In equation (9) we do not control explicitly for cross-border effects, which would require the inclusion of 
taxes in cheaper states, such as those which produce tobacco. Provided that the shipping costs of cigarettes in 
the US are similar across states, which is the case with the rise of internet sales, the omitted tax is the same as a 
time fixed effect. Hence, in our specification, aggregate time dummies capture cross-border effects.  
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imposed, usually by requiring separate areas for smokers and non smokers, as in airlines in 
1973. During the 1990s, smoking bans became more stringent, with the imposition of total 
bans in workplaces, public places, restaurants and bars. These were pioneered by 
municipalities and counties, mainly in California in the early 1990s.  The first states to 
impose such a ban were California and Utah with 100 percent smoke-free restaurants in 1995. 
An important point to note is that smoking bans are often introduced locally, at city or county 
level. These bans may conflict with preemption laws at state level, which prevent local 
communities from enacting local ordinances that are more stringent than the one defined at 
state level. These preemption laws have provided a way for tobacco firms to oppose smoking 
bans.  
Data on smoking bans are obtained from the American Non Smokers’ Rights 
Foundation, which collected the date of introduction of smoking bans, whether these were 
introduced at city, county or state level.11 All the dates pertain to the introduction of 100 
percent smoke free laws in workplaces, bars and restaurants where no pre-emption laws are 
in effect. Hence, we do not take into consideration policies that attempt to restrict smoking by 
designating special areas to smokers or non-smokers. Although these policies may prevent 
some exposure to tobacco smoke, there is a problem of enforcement. Second, they may have 
a lower effect on smoking behavior as they do not impose a heavy cost on smokers. 
We combine smoking bans for bars and restaurants by taking the date after which 
there is a complete ban in both bars and restaurants in a particular geographical location. We 
do so, because the distinction between bars and restaurants can be sometimes artificial and 
because we anticipate that bans in only one place may just displace smokers from one 
establishment to the other, with little overall effect. 
We aggregate the bans at state level, by computing the percentage of the population in 
any year that is covered by a full ban at work, or in bars and restaurants, using the population 
of cities, counties or states at the time of the ban.  
We merge to these data information on state level excise taxes. The data comes from the 
Tax Burden on Tobacco, published by The Tobacco Institute until 1998 and updated by 
Orzechowski and Walker (2001). It reports taxes by state and year. We deflate taxes using the 
consumer price index. Figure 1 plots the time trend of these policies at a national level.  
Excise taxes have risen from around 30 cents per pack in the late 1980s to more than 
80 cents in 2006, with a sharp rise from 2001 onwards (prices in 2000 dollars). Hardly any 
bans were in place before the mid 1990s, but in 2006, about 40 percent of the population was 
living in an area with a smoking ban in workplaces or with smoking bans in bars and 
restaurants. Of course, there are large differences across time and states, which we exploit in 
our empirical analysis. 12 
 
 
II. Effect of Bans and Taxes on Smokers 
 
A. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
We start the empirical analysis by investigating the effect of anti-smoking policies on 
smokers and smoking behavior. Previous results have used cross-sectional analysis or time 
series data to investigate their impact. Levy and Friend (2003) and Eriksen and Cerak (2008) 
                                                   
11 The data is available at www.no-smoke.org/pdf/EffectivePopulationList.pdf 
12 Much of the rise in the prevalence of bans in bars and restaurants is due to California, which imposed a state-
wide ban in 1995 in restaurants and in 1998 in bars. However, California is not the only state with bans, and if 
we exclude this state, the population covered by bans is more than 30 percent in 2006. 
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survey this literature, which finds an effect of regulation on smoking rates. In contrast, we use 
repeated cross-sectional data and control for time and geographical effects. 
We use data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveyance System (BRFSS), which 
collects data on health risk behavior. This is the most comprehensive data on smoking 
behavior and is used to monitor smoking trends at state level. Approximately 140,000 
individuals aged 18 or older are surveyed every year. The data set starts in 1984 and runs 
through to 2006.13 We also use data on adult per capita sales of cigarettes by state, between 
1970 and 2007 to investigate the effect of anti-smoking measures on the quantity smoked.14  
We focus on four different measures: smoking prevalence, the percentage of former 
smokers, attempted quits, and the number of cigarettes purchased per day. Smoking 
prevalence is a stock measure, which depends both on initiation and quits. The second 
outcome measures the percentage of former smokers among “ever smokers” and provides 
sharper information on the effects of anti-smoking policies on quits. Our third measure, 
attempted quits, is a flow variable measuring the proportion of smokers who have attempted 
to quit smoking within the last 12 months of the survey. One can conjecture that this outcome 
is able to detect in a more precise way any effect of policy variables.  
Figure 2 displays the trends in smoking behavior for all available years. Smoking 
prevalence decreased over the sample period, from about 29 percent to 19 percent. The 
proportion of former smokers increased from 43 percent to 55 percent during the same period. 
Attempted quits present a hump-shaped pattern, decreasing from 60 percent in 1990 to 44 
percent in 1995, and then increasing to 57 percent in 2006. Cigarette sales decreased from a 
peak at seven cigarettes per day to about three per day in 2007. 
 
B. Results 
 
Table 1 presents the results obtained using the four different measures discussed above. We 
display two sets of results for each smoking measure, either including aggregate time 
indicators or state specific linear trends. The first column indicates that an increase in 
smoking bans in workplaces from zero to 100 percent of the population increases the 
prevalence of smoking by 0.2 percentage points. However, this number is not significantly 
different from zero. In contrast, we find evidence of an effect of smoking bans in bars and 
restaurants. A total ban leads to a decrease in prevalence of about two percentage points. 
Similarly, a 100 percent increase in the state tax reduces the prevalence of smoking by about 
0.7 percentage points.  
These estimates are obtained with state fixed effects as well as with aggregate time 
indicators. Given that our data set covers up to 22 years of data per state, it is quite possible 
that the regression leaves out some state specific trends which are correlated with smoking 
bans and excise taxes. In column (2), we therefore add state specific linear trends to capture 
unobserved trends which may be correlated with both anti-smoking policies and changes in 
smoking behavior. 15 When controlling for state specific trends neither smoking bans in bars 
and restaurants nor taxes have a significant effect on smoking prevalence. 
Columns (3) and (4) display the effect of these policies on the percentage of former 
smokers. As for smoking prevalence, we do not find any evidence that smoking bans in 
workplaces lead to a change in smoking behavior. For smoking bans in bars and restaurants, 
we get conflicting results, with an increase in quitting when we use aggregate time indicators 
                                                   
13 Appendix A1 provides more details on the data set. 
14 We refer the reader to Appendix A1 for more information on the data. For this outcome, the regressions are 
done at state level, using population weights. 
15 This is also motivated by the fact that placebo regressions leading the policy variables forwards appear to pick 
up spurious effect when we only use an aggregate trend. See Appendix B. 
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and a decrease in quitting when we control for state specific trends. This result indicates that 
anti-smoking policies are confounded by trends at state level. Finally, excise taxes appear to 
increase quitting, although the effect is not significant once state linear trends are introduced.  
Column (5) shows the effect on attempted quits within the last twelve months, when 
we include aggregate time indicators. There is no evidence of an effect of smoking bans on 
attempted quits. On the other hand, higher taxes lead to an increase in attempted quits. 
Column (6) displays the results with state specific trends. It should be noted that the placebo 
results for this particular outcome in Table A 1 do not show spurious findings with aggregate 
time indicators, while with state specific trends, we find weak spurious evidence. This could 
be a sign of over-fitting when using state specific trends. Note as well that the time span is 
shorter than for the two previous outcome variables, ranging from 1990 only to 2006. 
Nevertheless, column (6) in Table 1 shows that tighter bans do not lead to a significant 
increase in attempted quits.  
The last two columns of Table 1 show the effect of anti-smoking policies on cigarette 
sales, expressed as the adult per capita consumption per day. When including an aggregate 
trend in the model, we find no significant effect of workplace bans, but a significant decrease 
of a quarter of cigarettes per day for bans in bars and restaurants. Doubling excise taxes lead 
to a decrease of one cigarette per day. Given the time span of the data (thirty eight years), an 
aggregate time trend will certainly not be enough to purge the model from the effect of 
omitted variables, such as anti-smoking sentiments or attitudes towards health. This can be 
seen in Table A 1, where placebo results are displayed. The regression finds spurious and 
large effects of bans in bars and restaurants, as well as for excise taxes. In contrast, the 
spurious results disappear when we include state specific trends in the model. Column (8) 
displays the results when state specific linear trends are added to the model. We do not find 
evidence of a significant decrease in the number of cigarettes consumed when introducing 
smoking bans (we even find evidence of an increase for bans in bars and restaurants, but this 
result is only significant at the 10% level). We find a negative effect of taxes on cigarette 
sales, which implies an elasticity of -0.13, which can be considered as a benchmark for the 
effect on non-smokers, which we present later. 
In summary, we do not find evidence that smoking bans, either in workplaces or in 
bars and restaurants, do have an effect on smoking behavior, in terms of consumption and 
smoking cessation. These results are not surprising given that the model has no firm 
predictions regarding these outcomes. 
 
 
III. Smoking Bans and Time Use 
 
In Section I.A, we show that our model predicts that smoking bans lead to a change in the 
way individuals spend their time in public and private places. In this section, we provide 
evidence on how much time individuals, including children, spend in places affected by 
smoking bans. We then investigate whether bans, and in particular those in bars and 
restaurants, induce a change in the amount of time individuals spend in different locations 
and with whom they are. This is important to understand the possible channels of passive 
smoking that we are investigating in section IV. 
 
A. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
The data is drawn from the American Time Use Survey covering the period 2003 to 2006. In 
addition, we use the National Human Activity Pattern Survey of time use which covers the 
period 1992 to 1994, although with a reduced sample size. Both surveys have a similar 
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structure. The survey includes individuals aged 18 and above. Each individual is asked to fill 
in a diary of the previous day with all primary occupations and locations. For each of the 
declared activities, the respondent was asked whether children were present at the time of the 
activity. A more detailed description of the data set can be found in Appendix A2. 
For the purpose of our analysis, we group the locations into three main categories, 
“home”, which include time at home (including outside occupation in a backyard and time at 
other’s homes), restaurants and bars, and all other locations, which include work, travel, or 
shopping.  
The survey includes some demographic characteristics such as age, sex, race, years of 
education, state of residence and the presence of children. In two periods, 1992 and 2003, the 
survey also includes information on smoking status. The survey provides weights to make the 
sample representative of the US population, which are used to compute all our results. This 
makes the results for the use of time comparable to the one on smoking behavior presented in 
the previous section.  
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of the data. On average, an individual spends 
about 17 hours per day at “home”, about 25 minutes in bars and restaurants and seven hours 
elsewhere (column one). If we only look at smokers (column 2), they spend almost twice as 
much time in bars and restaurants as the overall population (about 40 minutes). 
The remaining columns of Table 2 (columns 3-4) display the results for families with 
children.16  Household heads with children spend less time in bars and restaurants, about 19 
minutes. In particular, only 4 minutes per day is spent in that location when accompanied by 
children (column 4).  
From the model in Section I.A, a ban on smoking in these locations may affect 
children in two ways. In a direct way, bans may protect them against exposure to tobacco 
smoke, and, in an indirect way, those who do not attend those locations may be affected by a 
change in adult behavior. Adults may in fact spend less time in bars and restaurant once bans 
are introduced and transfer their smoking activity to locations where children are present. 
 
B. Results using time use data 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the effect of smoking bans in bars and restaurants on time 
spent in these locations.  
The first panel includes all individuals in the sample. The regression controls for age, 
sex, race, education, state GDP as well as a state of residence fixed effect and a set of 
aggregate time indicators. Given the size of the sample and the fact that we only have data for 
seven years, we do not control for state specific trends which could be correlated with both 
time spent in various location and anti-smoking policies. 
We find that smoking bans in bars and restaurants lead to a decrease of time spent in 
those locations by about six minutes per day. This effect is robust across days of the week as 
the size of the coefficient is similar in columns 1, 2 and 3. The introduction of a smoking ban 
decreases time spent at home and increases time spent in other locations, but we cannot reject 
a zero effect. 
The second panel in Table 3 conditions on smoking status. When we only consider 
smokers, we find that the significant and negative effect of bans in bars and restaurants on the 
time spent in these locations is of larger magnitude than when we considered smokers and 
non smokers together. In particular, we find that a total ban decreases the time spent by 
smokers in bars and restaurants by about 20 minutes per day. Moreover, as implied by the 
                                                   
16 Given the small number of smokers (information only available in two of the surveys), we did not 
attempt to compute statistics for smokers with children. 
11 
 
model presented in section I, we observe an increase of the amount of time that smokers 
spend at home when a smoking ban in bars in introduced (on average a smokers spend 57 
minutes more at home).  
The reduction in the amount of time spent by smokers in bars and restaurant due to 
the introduction of bans is similar during week days and at week-ends (columns 3 and 4). On 
the other hand the observed increase in the amount of time that smokers spend at home is 
attributable to weekdays and not to weekends. At weekends displacement occurs from bars 
towards other locations. 
In summary, we find evidence that bans on smoking in bars and restaurants tend to 
displace customers to different locations. This is particularly true for smokers We now show 
evidence using data on cotinine concentration in body fluids. 
 
 
IV. Effect of Taxes and Bans on Non-Smokers 
 
A. Cotinine as a proxy for smoking intake 
 
In Section II, we investigated the effect of anti-smoking policies on smokers, using cigarette 
consumption and smoking cessation. In order to analyze the effect of state interventions on 
non-smokers we need a measure of the amount of tobacco smoke inhaled by non smokers. 
We use the cotinine concentration in body fluids as a proxy. Cotinine is a metabolite of 
nicotine. While nicotine is unstable and is degraded within a few hours of absorption, 
cotinine has a half-life in the body of about 20 hours and is, therefore, a biological marker 
often used as an indicator of passive smoking.17 It can be measured in, saliva or serum, 
among other things. 
The use of cotinine has several advantages. First, cotinine is related to the exposure to 
cigarette smoke. Figure 3 plots the relationship between the total numbers of cigarettes 
smoked in the household and the cotinine level observed in the body fluids of non smokers 
sharing the house with smokers. 
The relationship between the number of cigarettes smoked in the household and the 
cotinine level in non smokers living with smokers is upward sloping. Second, cotinine – and 
nicotine from which it is derived- is a good proxy for the intake of health threatening 
substances in cigarettes. The nicotine yield of a cigarette is highly correlated with the level of 
tar and carbon monoxide, which causes cancer and asphyxiation.18,19 Cotinine is, therefore, a 
good indicator of health hazards due to exposure to passive smoking. Third, cotinine levels 
quickly reveal variation in exposure due to changes in policy, which is not the case with other 
markers such as tobacco related diseases which take time to develop. Finally, there is 
minimal measurement error, compared with self-declared exposure to cigarettes, which has 
been used as a measure of passive smoking. Cotinine is therefore a straightforward and 
precise measure of passive smoking, particularly suited to evaluate policies aimed at reducing 
smoking. The drawback of such bio-markers is that it is costly to collect and analyze, and it is 
rare to obtain large data sets covering many periods and large geographic areas. 
                                                   
17 The elimination of cotinine is slow enough to allow comparing measurements done in the morning or in the 
afternoon.  
18 Based on our data set (the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey), which report for some years the 
nicotine, tar and carbon monoxide yield of each cigarette, the correlations between nicotine and both tar and carbon 
monoxide are high, 0.96 and 0.85. 
19 The main health impacts of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) are lung cancer (more than 50 
epidemiological studies have examined the relationship between passive smoking and lung cancer; for a review see 
NHS Scotland, 2005), coronary heart diseases, respiratory disorders, and ETS in pregnancy can lead to low birth 
weight and poor gestational growth. 
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We use data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES 
III and NHANES 1999-2006). NHANES is a nationwide representative sample of the US 
civilian population. In particular, the data set includes a measure of the cotinine concentration 
in both smokers and non smokers (aged four and above). The number of cigarettes smoked in 
the household is also reported. The latter allows a distinction between non smokers that are 
exposed to passive smoke at home and non smokers that live in smoke-free households. For 
more information on this dataset, we refer the reader to Appendix A3. 
From the available sample we select non-smoking individuals. We drop all 
individuals who report themselves as a smoker or report consumption of cigarettes, cigars, 
pipes, snuff or chewing tobacco or use nicotine patches. We also drop all individuals who 
have a cotinine level in excess of 10 ng/ml. This rule is often used in epidemiological studies 
to distinguish smokers from non smokers.20 It represents about 5 percent of the declared non 
smokers. In total, we observe 42,009 non-smokers with a valid measure of cotinine 
concentration.21  
 
B. Trends in passive smoking 
 
Before examining regression results, we first provide a discussion on the trends in exposure to 
tobacco smoke. The cotinine concentration in non-smokers has halved over the 1990s, from about 
0.8 ng/ml in 1988 to 0.2 ng/ml in 2006 (Figure 4). This remarkable trend may indicate that 
policies which regulate smoking have been successful.  
Next, we separate non smokers who share their household with smokers, from non 
smokers who live in “smoke free” households. Figure 5 plots the cotinine concentration in non-
smokers living in non smoking households from 1988 to 2006.  Figure 6 shows, for the same time 
period, the cotinine concentration of non smokers sharing the house with smokers. 
The level of cotinine has been halved in non smokers living with non smokers over 
the period of analysis (1988-2006), from about 0.36 ng/ml to 0.15 ng/ml. However, policies 
have been less successful in reducing exposure of those who live with smokers. In the period 
considered the concentration of cotinine in non-smokers living with smokers does not show a 
similar trend (Figure 6). Despite the increasing level of severity in regulations and higher 
excise taxes, this evidence suggests that tobacco exposure of non smokers living in smoking 
households did not decrease. 22  
 
C. Effect of anti-smoking policies on passive smoking 
 
We now turn to regression results. As detailed in Appendix A3, one limitation of the data set is 
that not all states are surveyed in each year. This limits the identification of our model in the 
sense that the data does not support state specific trends. We therefore use region specific 
                                                   
20 See Jarvis et al, 1987. This threshold also constitutes the upper level of exposure of younger children (aged 6 or 
less) for whom we can presumably assume that they are genuinely non smokers. The distribution of cotinine is very 
skewed and mainly concentrated in the 0 - 2 ng/ml region which contains more than 90% of  the sample.  
21 All valid cotinine measures below the detection threshold (0.035 ng/ml), were set to the threshold value. 
22 An alternative interpretation is that of a change in composition in the pool of smokers. If higher taxes and tougher 
regulation encourage proportionally more light smokers to quit, the sample of non smokers in smoking household will 
shift towards a population more exposed to passive smoking. This would bias upward the effect of taxes or 
regulations. As a robustness check, we have also done the analysis by re-weighting the sample so that each year 
becomes comparable, in terms of observables, to the first year of our sample. This methodology is developed in 
DiNardo et al (1996) to study changes in wage inequality and relies on a change in composition which can be 
corrected by matching on observables. In this way, we are comparing groups of individuals who are similar in a 
number of observable characteristics. We re-weighted the sample by matching on a number of observable 
characteristics (sex, race, age group and income group). We found that the results are comparable to the analysis 
presented above. We provide further evidence in Section IV.E. 
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trends, using four regions. In addition, we include time-varying state variables that could be 
correlated both with exposure to tobacco smoke and anti-smoking policies. These variables 
are lagged state GDP, lagged smoking prevalence and the lagged proportion of former 
smokers. 
We first analyse the impact of bans and taxes on passive smoking in the whole sample 
of non smokers (Table 4, column 1). We then distinguish between four different age groups 
(columns 2 to 5). 
Considering first all non smokers (column 1), we find evidence of an effect of excise 
taxes on cotinine concentration. In particular doubling excise taxes reduces cotinine in non-
smokers by 0.06 ng/ml. We observe an increase in the level of cotinine in non smokers due to 
the introduction of smoke free bans both in the workplace and in bars and restaurants, though 
both coefficients are not significantly different from zero. In fact, the model derived earlier 
shows that the overall effect of smoking bans is ambiguous and depends on the relative 
amount of time spent by individuals in different locations.  
From a policy perspective, these results are interesting, although disheartening, as 
they suggest that, overall, bans do not protect non-smokers from exposure to tobacco smoke. 
However, such policies may have redistributive effects across age groups that we now report. 
The remaining columns of Table 4 separate non-smokers by age groups. In particular 
we distinguish between four different age groups. The first age group is from 4 to 8, an age 
where children are mostly either at home or in school or day-care, and supervised by an adult. 
At that age, it is unlikely that any peers would be smoking. These individuals are therefore 
exposed either to ETS at home, where parents or other adults in the household smoke, or in 
public places. The second age group ranges from 9 to 12, an intermediate age group between 
early childhood and adolescence. The third age group ranges from 13 to 19. Exposure for 
these individuals would come from parents and also from peers. Finally, we group all 
individuals aged 20 or above into group 4. We have experimented with different cut-off ages, 
in particular with younger and older adults, and have found similar results. 
Tighter regulations have different effects on the cotinine concentration depending on 
where they are enforced. When we consider different age groups separately, we observe that 
tighter bans in the workplace lead to an increase of cotinine levels particularly in children. 
Increasing the coverage of smoking bans in the workplace by 100 percent increases the 
exposure of children aged 4-8 by about 0.66 ng/ml. However this coefficient is not 
statistically significant. Stricter bans also lead to an increase in cotinine in children aged 8 to 
12. For them the effect is smaller (0.37 ng/ml) but strongly significant. The effect of tighter 
regulations in the workplace is not statistically different from zero both for teenagers and 
adults. 
The effect of tighter smoking regulations in bars and restaurants is not significantly 
different from zero. This is the case for all age groups apart from teenagers. For individuals 
aged 13-19 we observe a displacement effect of bans in these locations. An increase of ban 
coverage in bars by 100 percent increases teenagers’ exposure by about 0.55 ng/ml. 
While bans lead to an unwanted increase in cotinine level in non smokers, higher 
taxes have the desired effect of reducing cotinine levels. In particular this is true for children. 
For children aged 4 to 8, a doubling of taxes decreases the cotinine concentration by 0.21 
ng/ml. For children aged 8-12 the effect is of similar size (the doubling of taxes leads to a 
decrease of 0.23 ng/ml in the cotinine level). Expressed in terms of elasticities, these results 
imply an elasticity of exposure to tobacco smoke with respect to excise taxes of -0.36, which 
is almost three times as large as the tax elasticity of cigarette sales. This is evidence that 
cigarettes smoked in the presence children are the first to be cut as a result of a change in taxes. 
This suggests that smoking is partly a social activity so that smokers derive more utility when 
smoking with other adults. An alternative explanation could be that adults with children are 
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poorer and face liquidity constraints, which would make them more sensitive to a change in 
tobacco prices. The empirical literature has in fact documented the higher price elasticity for 
poorer individuals (Chaloupka (1991), Farrelly   et al (1998)). We take this into account by 
conditioning our results on family income and occupation of the head of household.23 
 
D. Uncovering displacement effects 
 
To probe further the results discussed up to here, we contrast the effect of these policies on 
groups of individuals who are more or less likely to be affected by the policy.  For example, one 
would expect larger effects for non-smokers living with smoking adults than for those in smoke-
free households. Moreover, any effect of smoking bans in workplaces should be larger during 
week days than at week-ends. 
We therefore estimate the following model: 
 
(10)             
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where Cot ist  is the cotinine concentration (expressed in ng/ml) and the remaining variables are 
defined in a similar way as in section I.B. iD  is an indicator for being tested for cotinine during 
weekends. We estimate this model by age group and by family smoking status. 
Table 5 reports the effect of changes in taxes and smoking bans by household 
smoking status, age group and day of the week. 24 
Changes in regulations and in taxes do not appear to have an effect on individuals 
living in non-smoking households when we consider all age groups together. The model 
presented in section I predicts this to be the case if non-smokers spend little time in public 
places where bans are enforced.  In addition, it could be the case that prior to the 100% 
smoke free laws, non-smokers were protected in public places by other means. For instance, 
it is possible that ventilation was already in place and was relatively efficient before stricter 
bans were in place, or that non-smokers were able to avoid exposure in designated areas.We 
do find, however, evidence of displacement for children following the introduction of bans in 
bars and restaurants. The observed increase in cotinine in children could be due to 
displacement of smokers who come to visit following the introduction of a ban in public 
places. 
The effect on non-smokers living in households with smokers is of particular interest. 
There is a marked increase in cotinine levels following a tightening of workplace bans on 
weekdays. A 100 percent increase in ban coverage increases cotinine levels by 0.9 ng/ml. 
This effect, in line with the empirical implications of the model, is particularly large for 
children, an age group that do not spend any time in the workplace.  
The effect of smoking bans in bars and restaurants also depends on the day of the 
week. In particular, we cannot detect an effect during weekdays, but we find a significant 
increase of cotinine levels in non-smokers during week-ends. A 100 percent increase in 
coverage increases children’s cotinine levels by 0.8 ng/ml.  These results are consistent with 
what is observed using time use data in Section III.B. Smokers spend less time in bars and 
                                                   
23 We check the robustness of these results in Table A 3 in the Appendix by regressing cotinine levels on leads 
of anti-smoking policies. We cannot reject that the “effects” of the policies are equal to zero, which may 
indicate that regional trends provides a rich enough structure to get rid of potential confounding trends. 
24 In this analysis, we grouped all children together (aged 4 to 18) as we also divide the sample by household 
smoking status and day of the week, which leads to smaller cells than in the previous analysis. 
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restaurants following the introduction of smoking bans in those locations, which would tend 
to increase the exposure of other family members in private places. In addition, smoking bans 
decrease the amount of time spent with children during week-days, which could explain the 
negative effect of bans in bars and restaurants during week-days for children in smoking 
households.  
We find displacement effects for bans in both workplace and bars and restaurants, 
which leads to an increase in cotinine levels in children approximately equal to 1ng/ml. We 
now investigate whether the size of this effect is plausible given the increase in the amount of 
time spent at home and the quantity of cigarettes smoked. Looking at data on cotinine and 
number of cigarettes smoked as displayed in Figure 3, we find that each cigarette smoked 
increases the cotinine concentration of children by 0.1ng/ml. However, we have to take into 
account that not all cigarettes are smoked in the presence of children. In particular, from 
Table 2, data on time use indicate that the time that adults spend with children is roughly a 
third of a day.  Hence, each cigarette smoked in the presence of children adds about 0.3ng/ml 
to cotinine levels. The displacement effect we observe corresponds therefore to a plausible 
increase of about two to four cigarettes per day smoked in the presence of children. 
The effect of taxes on non-smokers’ exposure is expected to be unambiguous. In 
particular, from the model presented earlier, we expect to find an effect of taxes for non-
smokers living with smokers. We find a significant effect of taxes for children living in 
smoking families, where a 100 percent increase in the excise tax reduces cotinine levels by 
0.3 to 0.5ng/ml, depending on the day of the week. 
Overall, the observed displacement effects are consistent with the predictions of the 
model presented in section I. The effect is particularly strong for individuals who do not 
spend much time in public locations (i.e. children) and therefore are mainly indirectly 
affected by the policy. 
 
E. Controlling for the potential endogeneity of bans and taxes: triple difference 
estimates 
 
The approach we are taking allows us to go one step further regarding the potential 
endogeneity of smoking bans, although we already control for a number of observed 
characteristics. Denote anti-smoking policies such as bans and taxes by iP  and let iD   be an 
indicator for being tested for cotinine during week-ends.  
Assume that ( | ) ( )i i iE P D E P= , ( | ) ( )i i i i iE Pu D E Pu=  and ( ) 0i iE u D = . The first 
expression states that bans and taxes are independent of the day of the week. The second 
expression implies that the potential endogeneity of regulations is orthogonal to the day when 
individuals are tested. Note that we do not require smoking bans or taxes to be exogenous. 
Finally, the last assumption requires that individuals are randomly sampled throughout the 
week.  
Under these assumptions, the estimators of DWβ , Dgoβ  and DTaxβ  in model (10) are 
consistent, even if bans or taxes are endogenous. The intuition behind this result is that these 
coefficients capture the differential impact of the policies across days of the week.25 This 
procedure is known as a triple difference estimator. 
Coming back to Table 5, this econometric result implies that the difference in the 
effect of smoking bans across days of the week is consistently estimated. These effects are 
displayed in the last three columns of Table 5. For instance, bans in the workplace increase 
the cotinine exposure of individuals living with smokers during week-days by 0.79ng/ml. 
                                                   
25 We refer the reader to Appendix B for a  proof.  
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Similarly, the effect of bans in bars for this group of individuals is an increase of 0.63ng/ml 
in cotinine levels during week-ends. This is evidence of displacement effects from public 
places to private ones, as outlined in the model in Section I.A, and holds even when we relax 
the assumption of the exogeneity of bans and taxes. 
The results in Table 5 separate smoking households from non-smoking ones. As we 
show in Figure 2, the prevalence of smoking has decreased over the last two decades. One 
may worry that part of the results discussed above are due to the change in composition of the 
sample. This is true in particular for households with smokers, as they form a smaller group. 
Anti-smoking policies may selectively induce some type of smokers to quit. For instance, if 
light smokers or smokers who care about their non-smoking relatives are more prone to quit, 
we may expect to see a spurious increase in cotinine levels. It is not easy to control for such a 
phenomenon, especially when only cross-sectional data is available. However, first, we note 
that we do not find much support in Section II for the fact that smoking bans induce smokers 
to quit. This does not necessarily imply that there is no selection in quitting, but its magnitude 
is likely to be small, as we do not find an overall effect of bans on quitting. Second, to probe 
further the robustness of the results, we follow DiNardo et al (1996) and reweight our 
regressions with weights constructed such that we keep the characteristics of the sample 
constant across time. We implement this by state and match on observed characteristics such 
as age, age of the reference person, race, education level of the reference person and income 
levels. We use a propensity score approach, where we first regress an indicator of smoking 
within the household on household characteristics. We then construct the weights using this 
score.  
We provide the results in Table A 4 in the Appendix. The results are robust. The most 
noticeable change is the effect of workplace bans on children during weekdays. The effect 
decreases from 1.2ng/ml to 0.6ng/ml. However, given the size of the standard errors, we 
cannot reject the hypotheses that these two numbers are equal.   
We provide further robustness checks in Table A 5 in the Appendix, where we lead 
the policy variables. The results are somewhat mixed, as several coefficients appear 
significant. This may be due to the size of the sample, and the fact that region specific time 
trends may not be enough to capture confounding trends. However, generally, the magnitudes 
of the effects are smaller, especially for the effect of excise taxes and smoking bans in bars 
and restaurants.  
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The effect of passive smoking is of increasing public concern. Although the economic 
literature has evaluated the effect of government intervention on smoking intensity or 
prevalence, there has been, so far, no direct evaluation of these measures on non-smokers.  
In this paper, we characterize the extent of exposure to environmental smoke, and 
evaluate the effect of changes in excise taxes and bans on passive smoking. We use a direct 
measure of passive smoking, which has not been used in the economic literature, the 
concentration of cotinine, a metabolite of nicotine, which is present in body fluids of both 
smokers and non-smokers. This allows us to precisely identify the effect of state intervention 
on non-smokers.  
We find that increasing taxes on cigarettes reduces average exposure to cigarette 
smoke of non-smokers. The effect of state excise taxes also varies across demographic groups. 
We find that taxes have a strong effect on young children living with smokers but no effect 
on non-smoking adults. This suggests that smokers cut down on the cigarettes they smoke at 
home but not those in social activities with other adults.  
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Using information on the implementation of smoking bans across time and different 
US states, we find that smoking regulations can have perverse effects on non-smokers. By 
displacing smoking, and to some extent smokers, bans can contribute to an increase in 
exposure to tobacco smoke. This effect is particular strong for young children, and those 
living with smokers. 
Our results question the usefulness of bans in reducing smoking exposure for non-
smokers. More precisely, we show that policies aimed at reducing exposure to tobacco smoke 
induce changes in behavior, which can offset these policies. It is therefore of crucial 
importance to understand how smoking behavior is affected by regulations. So far, the 
literature has not gone far enough in studying smoking behavior to be able to evaluate their 
effect on non-smokers. It is not enough to show that smokers react to prices or taxes. 
Information on which particular cigarette is cut down during the day, where smokers smoke 
and with whom are also relevant. There are complex interactions at play and considerable 
heterogeneity in their effects across socio-demographic groups. Using a biomarker such as 
cotinine concentrations is a very direct way of evaluating the overall effect of interventions 
and the induced changes in behavior. 
On the policy side, it seems therefore important when designing public policies aimed 
at reducing tobacco exposure of non-smokers to distinguish between the different public 
places where bans are introduced. Displacing smoking towards places where non-smokers 
spend time is particularly inefficient. It may also increase health disparities across socio-
economic groups and in particular in children. There are several reasons why one may want 
to protect children. They constitute a vulnerable group with little choice to avoid 
contamination. This age group is particular prone to tobacco related diseases and poor health 
in childhood has lasting consequences not only for future health but also for the accumulation 
of human capital (Case et al, 2005).   
Governments in many countries are under pressure to limit passive smoking. Some 
pressure groups can be very vocal about these issues and suggest bold and radical reforms. 
Their point of view is laudable, but too simplistic in the sense that they do not take into 
account how public policies can generate perverse incentives and effects. This paper provides 
insights on how to design optimal policies to curb passive smoking.  
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Appendix A: Data Description 
 
A.1. Data on smoking behavior 
 
We use data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveyance System (BRFSS) to get information 
on prevalence and smoking cessation. Data on cigarette sales are obtained from the State 
Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation System at the Center for Disease Control. 
The BRFSS is a survey, which collects data on health risk behavior since 1984 and is 
run by the Center for Disease Control. Data is collected monthly by a phone interview. In 
1984, 15 states were covered, and this number increased to 40 in 1989 and then 50 in 1993. 
As a consequence, the size of the survey has grown from 12,258 in 1984 to over 355,000 in 
2006.  
Individuals eighteen and older are surveyed and weights are provided to make the 
sample representative of the US non-institutionalized adult population. Only one individual 
per household is part of the survey. The data set reports demographics as well as individual 
smoking behavior. In total we have valid information about demographics and behavior on 
3,221,870 individuals. 
We use three indicators of smoking behavior, smoking prevalence (current smokers), 
the proportion of former smokers (defined as having smoked at least 100 cigarettes in own’s 
lifetime) and attempted quits (within the last year). 
Data on cigarette sales are expressed as the number of cigarettes per adult capita and 
per day. The data ranges from 1970 to 2007.26 In total, we have 1,938 state-year observations. 
 
A.2. Time use data 
 
We use two different surveys, the National Human Activity Pattern Survey (NHAPS) which 
covers the years 1992 to 1994 and the American Time Use Survey (ATUS), which covers the 
year 2003 to 2006.  
The NHAPS is a representative US human activity pattern survey which was 
conducted for the US Environmental Protection Agency. It consists of a 24 hour diary 
collected from 9386 individuals between 1992 and 1994, in all main-land US states. Each 
activity is recorded with an indication of the location, its duration and the presence of other 
persons (children in particular).   
The locations are coded into nine categories (Own house, Other people’s house, 
Workplace, School, Services and shops, Restaurants and Bars, Church, Traveling, Other). 
The dataset provides information on basic demographics (age, sex, race and education) as 
well as smoking status.  
The ATUS provides nationally representative estimates of how adults spend their time, 
with an indication of location for each activity as well as the presence of children. We linked 
the ATUS file to the 2003 Tobacco Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to 
get information on smoking status. There is no information available on smoking status in 
other years. In total, we have information on 60,674 individuals across all US states.  
 The locations were also grouped into the same categories as NHAPS. The same set of 
individual characteristics is available.  
For the purpose of the analysis, we pooled both data sets together, which provide 
valid information for 67,250 individuals. We computed the total time each individual spends 
in a specific location during the last 24 hours of the survey, expressed in minutes per day. We 
                                                   
26 The data can be obtained from the Center and Disease Control (http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/StateSystem). 
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also compute the time spent with children in different locations.  In all statistical 
computations, we use the weights provided in each data set to make it representative.  
 
A.3. NHANES 
 
The National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) is designed to assess the 
health and nutrition status of adults and children in the United States. For the purpose of this 
study, we pooled together the NHANES III, covering the periods 1988 to 1994 and the latest 
NHANES waves from 1999 to 2006.  
The data set reports information on the age, sex, race, health, education and occupation of 
the individual, as well as information at the household level such as family composition, income 
or geographical location. In addition, the data set also reports cotinine concentration in body 
fluids for individuals aged four and above. 
Approximately 5,000 persons are surveyed each year, across the US. The dataset 
contains a total of 70,303 individuals, out of which 57,950 are classified as non smokers. 
42,009 individuals have a valid cotinine measure. Two third of those without a cotinine 
measure are children below the age of 5, for whom no samples were taken. Most missings are 
from children below the age of 18. We use weights to take into account this pattern. 
We define an individual as a non smoker if that person reports not to be currently 
smoking or consuming tobacco through other ways (snuff, pipe). In addition, we classify as 
smokers all those who have a cotinine concentration above 10ng/ml, a standard cut-off point 
in the medical and epidemiology literature.   
One limitation of the dataset is that not all states are surveyed every year. Although, 
we potentially have data over fifteen years and for 51 states, in practice, the time span is 
shorter. Out of 765 potential state-year cells, the data has only information on 156 of them.27 
For 12 states, we have less than two points of observations, which is the minimum time span 
to include a state fixed effect. The states which have been surveyed most have information 
for 14 years. 
Table A 2 provides a summary statistic of the data set. Column 1 refers to the whole 
sample, columns 2 and 3 provide descriptive statistics for non-smokers living in household 
where the other members either smoke or not. The average cotinine concentration is equal to 
0.36ng/ml.  
69 percent of the sample has a cotinine concentration higher than the detectable 
threshold of 0.035ng/ml, while nine percent have a value higher than 1ng/ml. The amount of 
cotinine in non smokers living in a non smoking household is almost seven times lower than 
the amount of cotinine present in individuals living with smokers (0.21 n/ml in non-smokers 
living in non-smoking households compared to a level of 1.43 n/ml in individuals living with 
smokers). Individuals living in households with smokers have almost all detectable levels of 
cotinine, and are much more likely than non smokers living in non smoking households to 
have a concentration of cotinine above 1ng/ml. 
The average individual in a household where a smoker is present is younger than the 
average as smokers tend to quit as they age and young adults are more likely to have children 
living with them. Individuals in households with smokers are also more likely to be African-
American.  
 
 
                                                   
27 Confidentiality requirements prevent us from listing which states have been surveyed and the date of the 
survey. 
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Appendix B: Proof 
 
Suppose the following model holds for individual i: 
 
0 1,...i P i D i PD i i iy P D PD u i Nα α α α= + + + + =  
 
where iD is an indicator variable with ( | ) ( )i i iE P D E P= , ( | ) ( )i i i i iE Pu D E Pu=  
and ( ) 0i iE u D = . We place no restriction on the covariance between iP and iu , i.e.  we allow 
for the possible endogeneity of iP . Denote ,P Nα) , ,D Nα)  and ,PD Nα)  the OLS estimators of the 
parameters Pα , Dα  and PDα . 
 
Proposition: 
Under the assumptions detailed above, when N tends to infinity,  
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Assume that ( | ) ( )i i iE P D E x P= = , where upper bar variables denote variable means. 
Let [1, , , ]i i i iZ P D PD=  be N by 4 matrix and let 2Pσ denote the variance of iP , Puσ  and 
Duσ the covariance between iP  and iu  and iD  and iu . The expression for the asymptotic bias 
can be expressed (after some straightforward algebra): 
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Table 1: Effect of Bans and Taxes on Smoking in Adults.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Smoking 
Prevalence 
Smoking 
Prevalence 
% Former 
Smokers 
% Former 
Smokers 
Attempted 
Quits  
Attempted 
Quits 
Per Capita 
Cigarette Sales 
Per Capita 
Cigarette Sales 
Smoking Ban Workplace 0.216 0.254 -0.785 0.242 1.656 2.213 -0.225 -0.407 
 (0.33) (0.38) (0.47) (0.71) (2.00) (1.68) (0.24) (0.24) 
Smoking Ban Bar & 
Restaurants 
-2.02** -0.009 1.900** -0.948** -2.324 -2.638** -0.256** 0.370* 
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.22) (0.41) (1.56) (1.11) (0.11) (0.21) 
Log Tax -0.74** -0.18 0.668** 0.272 1.01** 0.373 -1.026* -0.560** 
 (0.23) (0.33) (0.32) (0.43) (0.36) (0.42) (0.11) (0.10) 
Number of observations 3,215,506 3,215,506 1,544,761 1,544,761 609,686 609,686 1,938 1,938 
Mean of dependent variable  22.9 22.9 51.5 51.5 53.6 53.6 5.86 5.86 
Trends Aggregate State Specific Aggregate State Specific Aggregate State Specific Aggregate State Specific 
    Years 1984-2006 1984-2006 1984-2006 1984-2006 1990-2006 1990-2006 1970-2007 1970-2007 
Notes: Regressions control for age, sex, race, education and state specific GDP. Robust standard errors clustered at state level are shown in parenthesis. Columns (1) to (6) use data 
from the BRFSS. Columns (7) and (8) use per capita sales of cigarettes data from the State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation System. **,* significant at 5%, 10%. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Time Spent in Different Locations (Minutes per Day) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Smokers Household with Children 
 Total Time Total Time Total Time Time with Children 
Home 1027.5 
(286.8) 
1018.6 
(288.0) 
1004.8 
(279.4) 
398.2  
(471.9) 
Restaurants & Bars 24.8  
(67.2) 
40.5  
(105.1) 
19.7  
(58.5) 
4.5  
(19.9) 
Other 387.6 
(280.7) 
380.8 
(279.5) 
415.4 
(276.2) 
58.3  
(120.5) 
Number of observations 66,880 3,079 30,616 29,063 
Notes: All times are in minutes per day. Time Use data, for the years 1992-1994 and 2003-2006. Standard 
deviations in parenthesis.  
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Table 3: Effect of Smoking Bans on Time Spent in Different Locations and with Children 
 All Days Week Days Week-End N 
All Population.     
Home -4.84 -11.45 9.70 66,833 
(12.88) (11.43) (9.86)  
Restaurants & Bars -6.35** -6.26* -6.62** 66,833 
(3.10) (3.60) (2.90)  
Other 11.19 17.71* -3.08 66,833 
 (10.50) (9.09) (8.98)  
Smokers     
Home 56.95* 98.31** -41.35* 3,065 
(34.13) (45.21) (22.77)  
Restaurants & Bars -21.44** -22.23** -18.13** 3,065 
(6.27) (6.85) (7.73)  
Other -35.51 -76.08 59.48** 3,065 
 (36.24) (47.46) (22.46)  
Notes: Regression controls for age, sex, education, race, state GDP, year indicators and state indicators. 
Robust standard errors are clustered by state. Data covers 1992-1994 and 2003-2006. **,* significant at 
5%, 10%. 
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Table 4: Effect of Anti-Tobacco Policies on Non Smokers, by Age. Dependent variable: Cotinine. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  All Ages Age<8 Age 8-12 Age 13-19 Age 20+ 
Average Cotinine Level 0.36 0.71 0.49 0.56 0.27 
(Standard deviation) (0.93) (1.38) (0.99) (1.22) (0.75) 
Smoking Ban Workplace 0.1476 0.661 0.3752** -0.1995 0.0766
 (0.127) (0.376) (0.111) (0.206) (0.104) 
Smoking Ban Bar & Restaurants 0.0355 0.0005 -0.0305 0.5506** -0.0118 
 (0.074) (0.182) (0.097) (0.191) (0.065) 
Log Tax -0.0585* -0.2111** -0.2304** 0.0079 -0.0369 
  (0.031) (0.117) (0.045) (0.069) (0.023) 
Sample Size 37,084 5,154 4,245 7,571 20,114 
Notes: Regression controls for age, sex, race, income, age of household reference person,  education of the head 
of household, state fixed effects, state GDP, lagged state prevalence, lagged state quitting rate and region 
specific time effects. Robust standard errors clustered at state level are shown in parenthesis.  **,* significant at 
5%, 10%. 
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Table 5: Effect of Anti-Tobacco Policies on Non Smokers, by Family Smoking Status, Day of Week and Age. Dependent variable: Cotinine. 
  Non-Smoking Families Smoking Families 
  Week Days Week-ends Week Days Week-ends 
  All Children Adults All Children Adults All Children Adults All Children Adults 
Smoking Ban Workplace -0.001 -0.084 0.020 -0.012 -0.219 0.039 0.953** 1.160** -0.224 0.161 -0.283 0.532 
 (0.115) (0.135) (0.113) (0.065) (0.113) (0.063) (0.431) (0.413) (0.335) (0.184) (0.469) (0.377) 
Smoking Ban Bar & Restaurants 0.015 0.198** -0.029 0.038 0.217** 0.000 -0.264 -0.635 0.499 0.365 0.832** -0.044 
 (0.065) (0.077) (0.067) (0.045) (0.058) (0.048) (0.359) (0.330) (0.300) (0.194) (0.382) (0.395) 
Log Tax -0.005 0.019 -0.015 -0.002 0.015 -0.012 -0.069 -0.301** 0.150 -0.144 -0.501** 0.200 
 (0.022) (0.036) (0.027) (0.019) (0.035) (0.019) (0.105) (0.137) (0.179) (0.111) (0.108) (0.236) 
Sample Size 30,736 11,700 19,036 30,736 11,700 19,036 6,340 4,127 2,213 6,340 4,127 2,213 
Notes: Regression controls for age of individual, age of household reference person, sex, race, household income, education of household reference person, state 
indicators, lagged state prevalence, lagged state quitting rate and region specific time effects.  Children are of age 4 to 18. Robust standard errors clustered at state level are 
shown in parenthesis.  **,* significant at 5%, 10%. 
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 Non-Smoking Families 
 Week Days Week-ends Difference 
 All Children Adults All Children Adults All Children Adults 
Smoking Ban Workplace -0.001 -0.084 0.020 -0.012 -0.219 0.039 0.011 0.135 -0.019 
 (0.115) (0.135) (0.113) (0.065) (0.113) (0.063) (0.0635) (0.084) (0.065) 
Smoking Ban Bar & Restaurants 0.015 0.198** -0.029 0.038 0.217** 0.000 -0.023 -0.019 -0.029 
 (0.065) (0.077) (0.067) (0.045) (0.058) (0.048) (0.033) (0.037) (0.035) 
Log Tax -0.005 0.019 -0.015 -0.002 0.015 -0.012 -0.003 0.004 -0.004 
 (0.022) (0.036) (0.027) (0.019) (0.035) (0.019) (0.014) (0.028) (0.017) 
Sample Size 30,736 11,700 19,036 30,736 11,700 19,036 30,736 11,700 19,036 
 Smoking Families 
 Week Days Week-ends Difference 
 All Children Adults All Children Adults All Children Adults 
Smoking Ban Workplace 0.953** 1.160** -0.224 0.161 -0.283 0.532 0.792** 1.443** -0.756* 
 (0.431) (0.413) (0.335) (0.184) (0.469) (0.377) (0.392) (0.589) (0.388) 
Smoking Ban Bar & Restaurants -0.264 -0.635 0.499 0.365 0.832** -0.044 -0.630** -1.467** 0.543** 
 (0.359) (0.330) (0.300) (0.194) (0.382) (0.395) (0.310) (0.523) (0.235) 
Log Tax -0.069 -0.301** 0.150 -0.144 -0.501** 0.200 0.075 0.200** -0.051 
 (0.105) (0.137) (0.179) (0.111) (0.108) (0.236) (0.081) (0.078) (0.111) 
Sample Size 6,340 4,127 2,213 6,340 4,127 2,213 6,340 4,127 2,213 
Notes: Regression controls for age of individual, age of household reference person, sex, race, household income, education of household reference person, state 
indicators, lagged state prevalence, lagged state quitting rate and region specific time effects.  Children are of age 4 to 18. Robust standard errors clustered at state 
level are shown in parenthesis.  **,* significant at 5%, 10%.
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Table A 1: Placebo: Policy Variables Leaded.  Smoking Behavior 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Smoking 
Prevalence 
Smoking 
Prevalence 
% Former 
Smokers 
% Former 
Smokers 
Attempted 
Quits 
Attempted 
Quits 
Per Capita 
Cigarette Sales 
Per Capita 
Cigarette Sales 
Smoking Ban Workplace 0.36 -0.12 -1.12** -0.21 1.52 -1.56 -0.137 -0.310 
 (0.33) (0.59) (0.28) (0.81) (1.45) (1.24) (0.25) (0.20) 
Smoking Ban Bar & 
Restaurants 
-1.77** -0.14 2.23** 0.72 -0.67 1.50* -0.692** 0.026 
 (0.27) (0.44) (0.31) (0.47) (1.30) (0.78) (0.19) (0.16) 
Log Tax -0.15 -0.21 0.31 0.46 0.82 0.14 -0.683** -0.083 
 (0.19) (0.16) (0.22) (0.34) (0.59) (0.51) (0.11) (0.06) 
Number of observations 3,221,870 3,221,870 1,547,452 1,547,452 610,523 610,523 1,785 1,785 
Mean of dependent variable  22.9 22.9 51.5 51.5 53.6 53.6 5.86 5.86 
Trends Aggregate  State Specific Aggregate State Specific Aggregate State Specific Aggregate State Specific 
    Years 1984-2006 1984-2006 1984-2006 1984-2006 1990-2006 1990-2006 1970-2007 1970-2007 
 Notes: Regressions control for age, sex, race, education and state specific GDP. Robust standard errors clustered at state level are shown in parenthesis. All policy variables are 
leaded three years. Columns (1) to (6) use data from the BRFSS. Columns (7) and (8) use per capita sales of cigarettes data from the State Tobacco Activities Tracking and 
Evaluation System. 
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Table A 2: NHANES, Descriptive Statistics 
 Whole sample Individuals in 
smoking families 
Individuals in Non smoking families 
Number of observations 42,009 7,231 34,529 
Average level of cotinine (ng/ml) 0.36 1.43 0.21 
 (0.92) (1.56) (0.68) 
Proportion with detectable cotinine measure (>0.035 
ng/ml) 
69% 99% 64% 
Proportion with cotinine >1 ng/ml 9% 46% 4% 
Proportion with cotinine >5 ng/ml 1% 4% 0.5% 
Average age 34.2 22.7 35.9 
Age range 0-90 0-90 0-90 
Male 46% 46% 46% 
White 70% 70% 70% 
Black 12% 18% 11% 
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis. The whole sample consists of all non-smoking individuals who have a valid cotinine measure 
lower than 10ng/ml. 
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Table A 3: Placebo: Policy Variables Leaded. Evidence from NHANES. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  All Ages Age<8 Age 8-12 Age 13-19      Age 20+
Average Cotinine Level 0.36 0.71 0.49 0.56 0.27 
(Standard deviation) (0.93) (1.38) (0.99) (1.22) (0.75) 
Smoking Ban Workplace -0.0125 -0.0502 -0.0752 0.1793 -0.1107 
 (0.059) (0.171) (0.109) (0.104) (0.068) 
Smoking Ban Bar & 
Restaurants -0.0562 -0.2365 0.3615 0.2702 -0.0669 
 (0.043) (0.211) (0.221) (0.196) (0.115) 
Log Tax 0.0419 0.099 -0.0169 0.1467 -0.0018 
  (0.051) (0.241) (0.089) (0.090) (0.044) 
Sample Size 31,291 4,404 3,553 6,195 17,139 
Notes: Regression controls for age, sex, race, income, age and education of household reference 
person, state fixed effects, state GDP and year time effects. All policy variables are leaded three years. 
Standard errors clustered at state level.  **,* significant at 5%, 10%. 
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Table A 4: Effect of Anti-Smoking Policy on Cotinine Levels. Re-Weighted Regressions. 
  Non-Smoking Families Smoking Families 
  Week Days Week-ends Week Days Week-ends 
  
All Children Adults All Children Adults All Children Adults All Children Adults 
Smoking Ban Workplace 0.001 -0.115 0.041 -0.062 -0.216 0.000 1.000** 1.137** -0.388 0.456 0.672 0.487 
 (0.125) (0.156) (0.122) (0.089) (0.127) (0.088) (0.367) (0.383) (0.612) (0.361) (0.504) (0.621) 
Smoking Ban Bar & Restaurants 0.029 0.176** -0.002 0.018 0.211** -0.030 0.052 -0.285 1.048 0.581 0.452 0.533 
 (0.065) (0.091) (0.067) (0.047) (0.067) (0.059) (0.433) (0.404) (0.677) (0.446) (0.476) (0.680) 
Log Tax -0.034 0.004 -0.051 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.328** 0.039 0.766** 0.170 -0.326** 0.754 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.029) (0.022) (0.031) (0.024) (0.144) (0.175) (0.286) (0.177) (0.143) (0.399) 
Sample Size 30,597 11,615 18,982 30,597 11,615 18,982 5,715 3,716 1,999 5,715 3,716 1,999 
Notes: Regression controls for age, sex, race, income, age and education of household reference person, state fixed effects, state GDP and year time effects. Standard errors 
clustered at state level.  **,* significant at 5%, 10%. 
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 Non-Smoking Families 
 Week Days Week-ends Difference 
 All Children Adults All Children Adults All Children Adults 
Smoking Ban Workplace 0.001 -0.115 0.041 -0.062 -0.216 0.000 0.063 0.101 0.041 
 (0.125) (0.156) (0.122) (0.089) (0.127) (0.088) (0.060) (0.100) (0.051) 
Smoking Ban Bar & Restaurants 0.029 0.176** -0.002 0.018 0.211** -0.030 0.011 -0.035 0.028 
 (0.065) (0.091) (0.067) (0.047) (0.067) (0.059) (0.048) (0.038) (0.063) 
Log Tax -0.034 0.004 -0.051 0.006 0.004 0.002 -0.041 0.000 -0.053 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.029) (0.022) (0.031) (0.024) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) 
Sample Size 30,597 11,615 18,982 30,597 11,615 18,982 30,597 11,615 18,982 
 Smoking Families 
 Week Days Week-ends Difference 
 All Children Adults All Children Adults All Children Adults 
Smoking Ban Workplace 1.000** 1.137** -0.388 0.456 0.672 0.487 0.544 0.465 -0.875** 
 (0.367) (0.383) (0.612) (0.361) (0.504) (0.621) (0.289) (0.431) (0.260) 
Smoking Ban Bar & Restaurants 0.052 -0.285 1.048 0.581 0.452 0.533 -0.530* -0.737** 0.515 
 (0.433) (0.404) (0.677) (0.446) (0.476) (0.680) (0.257) (0.245) (0.324) 
Log Tax 0.328** 0.039 0.766** 0.170 -0.326** 0.754 0.158 0.365** 0.011 
 (0.144) (0.175) (0.286) (0.177) (0.143) (0.399) (0.120) (0.093) (0.204) 
Sample Size 5,715 3,716 1,999 5,715 3,716 1,999 5,715 3,716 1,999 
Notes: Regression controls for age of individual, age of household reference person, sex, race, household income, education of household reference person, state 
indicators, lagged state prevalence, lagged state quitting rate and region specific time effects.  Children are of age 4 to 18. Robust standard errors clustered at state 
level are shown in parenthesis.  **,* significant at 5%, 10%.
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Table A 5: Placebo: Policy Variables Leaded: Evidence from NHANES 
  Non-Smoking Families Smoking Families 
  Week Days Week-ends Week Days Week-ends 
  All Children Adults All Children Adults All Children Adults All Children Adults 
Smoking Ban Workplace -0.07 -0.03 -0.09 -0.13** -0.10 -0.15** 0.51** 0.75** 0.13 0.22 -0.40 1.10** 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.19) (0.26) (0.20) (0.23) (0.39) (0.23) 
Smoking Ban Bar & 
Restaurants -0.00 0.20** -0.05 -0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.15 -0.21 -0.33 0.02 0.66 -1.03** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.26) (0.43) (0.31) (0.27) (0.47) (0.30) 
Log Tax -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.05 -0.18 0.02 0.05 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.17) (0.20) (0.21) (0.15) (0.19) (0.20) 
Sample Size 25,531 9,460 16,071 25,531 9,460 16,071 5,752 3,730 2,022 5,752 3,730 2,022 
Notes: Regression controls for age, sex, race, income, age and education of household reference person, state fixed effects, state GDP and year time effects. Children are of 
age 4 to 18. All policy variables are leaded three years. Standard errors clustered at state level.  **,* significant at 5%, 10%. 
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Figure 1: Bans and Excise Taxes by Year (US Average) 
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Figure 2: Trends in Smoking Behavior 
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Figure 3: Cotinine Level by Number of Cigarettes Smoked in the Household 
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Figure 4: Average Cotinine in Non Smokers 
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Figure 5: Average Cotinine in Non Smokers from Non Smoking Families 
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Figure 6: Average Cotinine in Non Smokers from Smoking Families 
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